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Emanuele	Serrelli1	
Metascientific	Views:	Challenge	and	Opportunity	for	Philosophy	of	Biology	in	
Practice		In	this	paper	I	take	evolutionary	biology	as	an	example	to	reflect	on	the	role	of	 philosophy	 and	 on	 the	 transformations	 that	 philosophy	 is	 constantly	stimulated	to	do	in	its	own	approach	when	dealing	with	science.	I	consider	that	 some	 intellectual	 movements	 within	 evolutionary	 biology	 (more	specifically,	 the	 various	 calls	 for	 ‘synthesis’)	 express	metascientific	 views,	i.e.,	 claims	 about	 ‘what	 it	 is	 to	 do	 research’	 in	 evolutionary	 biology	 at	different	 times.	 In	 the	 construction	 of	 metascientific	 views	 I	 see	 a	fundamental	role	to	be	played	by	philosophy,	and,	at	the	same	time,	a	need	to	 complement	 the	 philosophical	 methods	 with	 many	 more	 methods	coming	from	other	sciences.	What	 leads	philosophy	out	of	 itself	 is	 its	own	attention	to	scientific	practice.	My	humble	methodological	suggestions	are,	at	 this	 stage,	 only	meant	 to	help	us	 imagine	metascientific	 views	 that	 are	built	 with	 a	 more	 scientific,	 interdisciplinary	 approach,	 in	 order	 to	attenuate	 partiality,	 subjectivity	 and	 impressionism	 in	 describing	 the	scientific	community.	And	yet,	we	should	not	be	naïve	and	imbued	with	the	myth	of	‘data-driven’	research,	especially	in	this	field:	other	complex	issues	about	 metascientific	 views	 call	 for	 a	 serious,	 constant	 philosophical	reflection	on	scientific	practice.	Keywords:	 Philosophy	 of	 science	 in	 practice;	 Philosopy	 of	 biology;	Evolutionary	synthesis;	Interdisciplinarity.		
1.	Introduction	More	than	once,	through	its	history,	evolutionary	biology	has	tried	to	get	a	meaningful	and	 comprehensive	 snapshot	 of	 itself.	 A	 few	 of	 these	 crucial	 moments	 are	 defined	‘syntheses’:	 these	 include	 the	Modern	 Synthesis	 some	 decades	 ago,	 and	 the	 Extended	Evolutionary	 Synthesis	 today	 (Laland	 et	 al.	 2014,	 Laland	 et	 al.	 2015).	 I	 have	 studied	synthesis	 for	several	years	now	(e.g.,	Serrelli	2015,	2016a,	Eldredge	et	al.	2016),	and	I	have	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 we	 may	 usefully	 define	 both	 ‘syntheses’	 as	
metascientific	 views,	 in	 that	 they	 consist	 in	 claims	 about	 ‘what	 it	 is	 to	 do	 research’	 in	evolutionary	biology	at	different	 times.	Only	 indirectly	 they	are	scientific	 claims	about	evolutionary	processes,	although	the	two	aspects	–	the	scientific	and	metascientific	–	are	hardly	separable	(indeed,	 inseparable)	 in	any	chiefly	scientific	or	chiefly	metascientific	discourse.	I	take	evolutionary	biology	as	just	an	example	to	reflect	on	the	role	of	philosophy	and	on	the	transformations	that	philosophy	is	constantly	stimulated	to	do	in	its	approach.	In	the																																									 																					1 	University	 of	 Milano-Bicocca,	 CISEPS	 Center	 for	 Interdisciplinary	 Studies	 in	 Economics,	Psychology	and	Social	Sciences.	Email:	emanuele.serrelli@unimib.it	
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construction	of	metascientific	views	I	see	a	fundamental	role	to	be	played	by	philosophy	of	 biology	 (Serrelli	 2016b),	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 need	 to	 complement	 the	philosophical	methods	with	many	more	methods	coming	 from	other	sciences.	 In	other	words,	I	see	both	a	constant	opportunity	and	a	call	for	humility.	The	opportunity	for	philosophy	comes,	on	the	one	hand,	from	the	fact	that	metascientific	views	 are	 perceived	 as	 a	 need	 by	 the	 scientists	 too,	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 from	 the	intrinsic	complexity	of	the	effort.	A	comprehensive	and	reliable	picture	of	evolutionary	biology	is,	in	principle,	very	useful	to	evolutionary	biology	itself	as	a	research	enterprise.	Fragmentation	 coming,	 for	 example,	 from	 compartmentalization	 and	 hyper-specialization	is	often	seen	as	an	obstacle	to	the	advacement	of	the	science	of	evolution	in	 many	 ways	 (Sidlauskas	 et	 al.	 2009).	 A	 sense	 of	 evolutionary	 biology	 as	 a	 moving	whole	can	be	crucial	for	many	important	issues	such	as	biology	training,	or	funding	and	rewarding	policies.	The	 lack	of	 a	 general	picture	of	 evolution,	 or	 at	 least	of	 a	 sense	of	communal	 endeavour,	 can	 prevent	 a	 researcher	 from	 grasping	 the	 potential	evolutionary	relevance	of	their	study	case,	or	from	accessing	precious	resources.	In	sum,	syntheses	deserve	careful	consideration	because	of	their	potential	‘maintenance	effects’,	ultimately	aiding	evolutionary	biology	in	pursuing	its	own	knowledge	aims.	But	metascientific	 views	 are	 intrinsically	 complex:	 their	 achievement	 requires	 a	 great	effort	of	domesticating	a	huge	mass	of	scientific	literature	(the	latter	being,	in	turn,	only	one	 aspect	 of	 scientific	 work);	 they	 intertwine	 metascientific	 with	 scientific	 claims,	descriptive	with	prescriptive	aspects,	and	multiple	historical	chronologies;	and	they	are	often	elaborated	 through	conceptual	 analysis	by	one	or	 few	scientists	who	cannot	but	rely	 on	 their	 particular	 experience	 and	 hold	 stakes	 in	 the	 scientific	 debate.	 All	 these	features	of	metascientific	views	strongly	call	for	philosophical	inquiry	and	–	as	I	became	inclined	to	remind,	 like	a	mantra	–	 for	an	attention	to	scientific	practice	(Ankeny	et	al.	2011,	 Boumans	 and	 Leonelli	 2013,	 Soler	 et	 al.	 2014).	 But	we	 should	 recognize	 at	 the	outset	 that	philosophy	of	science	 is	being	 led	out	of	 itself,	 towards	an	 integration	with	the	 methods	 of	 other	 scientific	 fields.	 What	 leads	 philosophy	 there	 is	 exactly	 the	attention	 to	 scientific	 practice.	 In	 fact,	 the	 fundamental	 problem	of	 logical	 analyses	 of	science	is	that	scientists	do	not	live	inside	theories,	rather,	at	any	particular	moment	in	time,	they	have	different	versions	or	pieces	of	theory,	with	which	they	entertain	diverse	relationships.	Different	periods	of	evolutionary	biology	can	be	described	as	nested	sets	of	concepts	and	ideas	(Fig.	1),	but	evolutionary	biology	in	1980,	in	the	1930s,	and	at	any	moment	in	history,	is	a	working	scientific	community	that	has	to	be	studied	under	more	aspects.	While	 rigorous	methods	 such	 as	meta-analysis	 are	 used	 to	 combine	 available	scientific	evidence,	rigorous	ways	of	knowing	the	scientific	community	seem	scarcer.	
2.	Many	Methods	for	Getting	to	Know	a	Scientific	Community	The	 intellectual	 movement	 called	 “Extended	 Evolutionary	 Synthesis”	 (EES)	 can	 be	traced	back	to	Massimo	Pigliucci	and	Gerd	Müller	(Pigliucci	2007,	Müller	2007,	Pigliucci	&	Müller	2010).2	The	extension	that	the	EES	suggests	refers	takes	the	Modern	Synthesis	
																																								 																					2	It	 would	 be	 necessary	 to	 assess	 Pigliucci	 and	 Müller’s	 discontinuities	 and	 continuities	 with	respect	 to	 previous	 works	 like	 Gould’s	 or	 Stebbins’s.	 This	 would	 be	 particularly	 important	because	the	EES	has	the	ambition	of	summoning	the	pleas	that	have	been	accumulating	over	the	
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(MS),	 temporally	 located	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 as	 a	 reference	 point.	 A	reconstruction	 of	 the	 Modern	 Synthesis	 was	 published	 in	 1980	 by	 Ernst	 Mayr	 and	William	Provine	(Mayr	and	Provine	1980).	While	the	book	became	the	official,	although	in	 fact	 multifarious,	 account	 of	 the	 MS,	 the	 account	 was	 paralleled	 and	 immediately	followed	 by	 pleas	 for	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 Modern	 Synthesis.	 Some	 critics,	 like	 early	Stephen	 Jay	 Gould	 (1980,	 1982),	 were	 more	 radical,	 whereas	 others,	 like	 G.	 Ledyard	Stebbins,	 adopted	 a	 more	 integrative	 approach	 (Stebbins	 and	 Ayala	 1981;	 Stebbins	1983).3	Müller	and	Pigliucci	wanted	to	point	out	some	missing	elements	of	the	MS	that	are	being	added	by	current	evolutionary	research.	Initially,	they	both	focused	on	‘organic	form’	as	something	 overlooked	 by	 the	 ‘essentially’	 genetic	MS,	 then	 they	 consciously	 started	 a	proliferation	 of	 reflections	 on	 the	 EES,	 where	 they	 assembled	 a	 broader	 extension	beyond	the	issue	of	‘form’.	In	Fig.	1	we	see	Darwinism,	the	MS,	and	the	EES	represented	as	 successive	 expansions	 of	 “conceptual	 pillars”	 (Pigliucci	 2007).	 Notice	 that	 these	expansions	 are	 meant	 to	 show	 not	 only	 cumulative	 growth	 of	 knowledge	 about	evolution,	 but	 also	 the	 various	 transformations	 of	 evolutionary	 biology	 as	 a	 scientific	field.	The	different	circles	aim	at	being	representative	of	how	working	 in	evolutionary	biology	was,	is,	and	will	be	at	different	times.	
	
Figure	 1.	 A	 comparison	 between	 the	 elements	 of	 an	 Extended	 Evolutionary	 Synthesis	 (EES)	appearing	 in	 two	different	publications:	 (a)	 from	Pigliucci	 (2009);	 (b)	 from	 the	collective	book	
Evolution:	The	Extended	Synthesis	 (ed.	by	Pigliucci	 and	Müller	2010).	Each	of	 the	 two	diagrams	describes	the	EES	as	inclusive	of	Darwinism	(inner	circle),	the	Modern	Synthesis	(middle	circle),	and	additional	concepts	(outer	circle).	A	comparison	among	publications	(either	with	or	without	diagrams)	 uncovers	 dynamism	 and	 problematic	 factors	 of	 complexity	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	metascientific	view.	According	to	Pigliucci	(2007),	for	example,	the	MS	coincides	with	evolutionary	genetics,	as	its	foundations	had	consisted	in	a	movement	of	“crystallization”	of	a	“theory	of	genes”	out	 of	 the	 original	 Darwinian	 “theory	 of	 form”	 (p.	 2744).	 Pigliucci	 supported	 such	 a	claim	with	 a	 brief	 conceptual	 history	 of	 evolutionary	 biology,	 summarizing	 how	 20th																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														years.	The	analysis	is	however	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	review,	but	some	disconnects	will	be	mentioned.	3	Stebbins	is	also	considered	among	the	architects	of	the	MS	(Pigliucci	2009,	p.	220;	Pigliucci	and	Müller	2010,	p.	8;	Stebbins	1950).	Both	Gould	and	Stebbins,	although	 in	different	ways,	moved	towards	 macro-evolutionary	 extension	 of	 the	 MS	 (Serrelli	 and	 Gontier	 2014).	 Pigliucci	 and	Stebbins	share,	besides	their	interest	in	extending	the	MS,	their	specialization:	both	are	botanists.	
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Century	Darwinism	overcame	Lamarckism,	and	how	Mendelism	was	made	compatible	with	gradual	change	by	means	of	statistical	works	by	Fisher,	Haldane	and	Wright	(Ivi,	p.	2744).	 He	 described	 the	 major	 theoretical	 contributions	 by	 Dobzhansky,	 Mayr,	 and	Simpson	 in	 the	 1940s,	 and	 then	 identified	 some	missing	 elements	 in	 the	MS,	 namely:	development,	studied	separately	by	embryologists	(p.	2745);	ecology,	secluded	away	as	a	 background	 condition	 of	 evolution	 (Ibidem);	 implications	 of	 the	 ‘-omics	 revolution’,	and	 its	 relationships	 to	neutralism	and	 complex	genotype-phenotype	 interactions	 (pp.	2745-6);	 and	 phenomena	 such	 as	 plasticity,	 evolutionary	 capacitance,	 epigenetic	inheritance	(p.	2746).	An	EES	would	 integrate	a	 theory	of	 form	back	 into	evolutionary	biology	(p.	2745).	Some	“bits	and	pieces”	or	“recurring	ideas”	(p.	2746)	that	will	be	part	of	 the	 EES	would	 be:	 evolvability,	 hinging	 on	 developmental	 systems’	modularity	 and	robustness	 (p.	 2746);	 phenotypic	 plasticity	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 modes	 of	 evolution	such	 as	 genetic	 accommodation	 (pp.	 2746-7);	 epigenetic	 and	 multiple	 inheritance	 (p.	2747);	 complexity	 theory,	 revealing	 organizing	 principles	 different	 from	 natural	selection	(Ibidem);	and	updated	adaptive	landscapes,	 in	 light	of	work	 that	reformulates	their	 general	 shape	 (pp.	 2747-8).	 Concluding	 the	 2007	 paper,	 Pigliucci	 anticipated	 a	new,	complex,	constructive	process	analogous	to	the	MS	itself,	a	progressive	“expansion	of	 theoretical	 biology	 (in	 the	 broader	 sense	 of	 conceptual	 understanding	 of	 the	discipline’s	foundations)”	(p.	2748).	The	 idea	 of	 an	 EES	 enjoyed	 some	 success	 in	 the	 last	 few	 years.	 For	 example,	 several	scientific	 journals	 reviewed	 the	 EES	 book	 (Pigliucci	 and	 Müller	 2010)	 as	 a	 research	proposal	 (Plutynski	 2011;	 Reiss	 2011;	 Travis	 2011;	Witteveen	 2011;	 Handschuh	 and	Mitteroecker	2012).	 Some	 scientists	 accepted	 the	 challenge	 of	 imagining	how	 the	EES	will	eventually	be	(Brooks	and	Agosta	2012),	possibly	pointing	out	neglected	extensions	(Boto	2010;	Weber	2011).	Some	scholars	used	the	EES	perspective	to	look	at	evo-devo	(Love	2009;	Medina	2010),	at	population	genetics	(Akey	and	Shriver	2011),	and	at	other	fields	 (Noble	 2011;	 Danchin	 2013;	 L.A.B.	 Wilson	 2013),	 and	 many	 focused	 on	epigenetics	 (Danchin	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Schrey	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Dickins	 and	 Rahman	 2012).	 The	socio-cultural	sciences	showed	an	interest	in	the	extension	of	the	MS	as	well	(Mesoudi	et	al.	2013;	Laland	et	al.	2009).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 EES	 became	 the	 object	 of	 interesting	 controversies.	 Single	concepts	 of	 the	 EES	 have	 been	 questioned	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 scientific	 validity,	relevance,	or	innovativeness	(Reiss	2011).	Coyne	(e.g.,	2009)	questions,	for	example,	the	real	evolutionary	 incidence	of	epigenetic	 inheritance	due	to	the	short	 life	of	epigenetic	changes	 over	 generations.	 Some	 pillars	 create	 different	 factions	 concerning	 their	compatibility	 with	 long-standing	 knowledge	 (e.g.,	 for	 evo-devo,	 Minelli	 2010	 vs.	Laubichler	2010).	But	many	other	 issues	 are	more	exquisitely	metascientific:	 they	are	about	 the	 science,	 not	 the	world.	 Fields	 such	 as	 “population	 genetics”	 or	 “ecology”	 or	“evo-devo”	 that	 are	 listed	 among	 EES	 conceptual	 pillars	 are	 metascientific	 concepts	rather	 than	 scientific	 ones	 (more	 will	 be	 said	 on	 this	 below).	 Another	 purely	metascientific	debate	is	the	one	concerning	the	age	of	‘pillars’:	claims	for	additions	to	the	MS	are	also	claims	 for	 the	 long	absence	of	some	 ingredient,	 for	example	ecology,	 from	the	 field	 of	 evolutionary	 biology.	 Such	 absence	 is	 typically	 contested	 by	 groups	 of	scientists	 who	 claim	 to	 have	 always	 taken	 ecology	 (or	 whatever	 pillar	 at	 hand)	 into	consideration,	 or	 who	 point	 out	 forerunners.	 The	 timing	 of	 virtually	 each	 and	 every	
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concept	is	a	matter	of	metascientific	quarrel	between	different	members	of	the	scientific	community.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 more	 fundamental	 disagreement	 about	 the	 EES	 as	 such.	Müller	 and	 Pigliucci	 (2010)	 observe	 two	 opposite	 reactions	 to	 the	 EES:	 the	 “nothing-substantially-new”	 position	 and	 the	 “more-change-is-needed”	 position.	 The	 first	position	is	seen	as	being	represented	by	scientists	such	as	Douglas	Futuyma	and	Michael	Lynch.	 Futuyma	 (2011,	 2014)	 thinks	 that	 evolutionary	 biology	 had	 absorbed	 and	incorporated	 discoveries	 throughout	 its	 history,	 without	 the	 need	 for	 a	 formal	reconsideration	of	evolutionary	theory,	and	Lynch	(2007)	sees	a	multiplication	of	things	to	explain	more	than	of	explanations.	The	second	position,	expressed	in	papers	such	as	Craig	 (2010,	 2011),	 is	 against	 extending	 the	 MS	 because	 elements	 such	 as	 evo-devo	would	completely	overthrow	it:	the	MS	would	not	be	amendable.	Although	some	of	the	cited	 workers	 actually	 have	 nuanced	 opinions,	 some	 of	 them	 did	 indeed	 express	themselves	 in	 sharp	 contrast	with	 the	 EES	 through	 various	media	 (e.g.,	 Coyne	 2009).	Proponents	of	 the	EES	usually	explain	away	such	a	diffuse	dissent	by	 the	conservative	inertia	or	active	homeostasis	of	science,	 ‘paradigmatic’	almost	 in	a	Kuhnian	sense.	 It	 is	evident,	 in	 my	 view,	 that	 ongoing	 controversies	 on	 the	 EES	 mingle	 scientific	 and	metascientific	aspects.	How	do	we	get	insights	about	the	shifting	state	of	something	so	broad,	fragmented,	and	lively	 such	 as	 evolutionary	 biology?	 An	 obvious	 obstacle	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	metascientific	 consensus	 is	 what	 could	 be	 called	 the	 scientist-field	 disproportion.	Evolutionary	biology	is	vast	in	terms	of	involved	people	and	labs	all	over	the	world,	with	their	diversity	and	ever-changing	boundaries.	All	sorts	of	science	are	being	done	in	the	world:	do	they	fit	the	mind	and	the	reach	of	one	or	few	experts?	How	can	we	know	what	all	those	people	are	doing?	Massimo	Pigliucci	(2009),	to	explain	shifts	in	his	list	of	concepts	(Fig.	1),	acknowledges	a	particular	meeting	(the	“Altenberg	meeting”,	Pigliucci	&	Müller	2010)	as	an	occasion	for	him	 to	 expand	 his	 thinking	 about	 evolutionary	 theory.	 Taking	 the	 cue	 from	 this,	 we	ought	to	think	that,	in	general	and	inevitably,	concepts	are	included	by	the	author	partly	as	a	function	of	contingent	biographical	and	professional	factors,	such	as	the	particular	field	of	specialization,	the	network	of	professional	contacts,	the	encounters	that	happen,	or	even	some	kind	of	personal	 taste.	Factors	 like	these	are	also	subject	 to	change	over	lifetime.	All	 this	 speaks	 about	 the	disproportion	between	 any	 scientist’s	 point	 of	 view	and	the	necessary	 task	of	mapping	the	 field,	at	any	time	 in	history.4		 Just	 think	to	how	huge	and	fast-growing	the	scientific	literature	is	today.	A	metascientific	view	aspires	to	describe	 the	 web	 of	 networks	 of	 researchers	 and	 labs	 that	 constitute	 evolutionary	biology,	 i.e.,	 people,	 along	 with	 their	 actions	 and	 knowledge,	 their	 instruments,	 the	different	 media	 and	 various	 kinds	 of	 connections	 among	 them,	 and	 also,	 in	 part,	 the	larger	contexts	in	which	they	work	and	operate.	When	we	are	interested	in	an	empirical	concept	such	as	phenotypic	plasticity,	then,	we	want	to	know	for	example	where,	when,	how,	 and	 how	 much	 phenotypic	 plasticity	 was	 effectively	 studied	 in	 relation	 to	evolution.	 And	 it	 is	 not	 even	 enough	 to	 know	 how	 frequently	 phenotypic	 plasticity	 is	mentioned,	or	who	are	 the	most	cited	 ‘experts’	of	 it.	Before	being	able	 to	demonstrate																																									 																					4	To	 the	 scientist-field	 disproportion	 we	 will	 add,	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 ‘flag	 effect’:	 any	scientist’s	claims	are	part	of	socio-epistemological	and	socio-economical	dynamics	where	he	or	she	has	needs,	aims,	open	accounts.	
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that	 plasticity	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 change	 of	 how	 evolutionary	 biology	 is	 practiced,	 we	need	to	deal	with	how	phenotypic	plasticity	 is	 integrated	 in	scientific	practice,	what	 is	its	incidence	and	role.	How	has	the	understanding	of	some	concepts	changed?	And	what	is	 the	 importance	 of	 concepts	 in	 scientific	 work	 in	 different	 contexts	 and	 periods?	 In	other	words,	how	much	research	is	theory-engaged	and	theory-driven	(Scheiner	2013)?		While	databanks	of	specific	research	objects	(a	gene,	a	species)	are	flourishing,	scientists	don’t	 access	meaningful	 and	 rigorous	data	about	 the	 scientific	 community.	 Yet,	 let	me	suggest	 that	 helpful	 methods	 and	 notions	 exist	 in	 different	 disciplines,	 and	 perhaps	would	 only	 need	 to	 be	 applied	 and	 integrated	 to	 construct	 a	 metascientific	 view	 of	evolutionary	biology.	What’s	the	real	trajectory	of	the	consideration	of	phenotypes,	or	of	ecology,	 in	 the	 community	 of	 evolutionary	 biologists?	 What	 is	 really	 happening	 to	evolutionary	 biology	 in	 relation	 to	 what	 many	 people	 call	 ‘evo-devo’,	 or	 with	 what	different	groups	call	‘integration	of	evolution	with	ecology’?	When	and	how,	if	ever,	evo-devo	changed	the	way	evolutionary	research	is	carried	out	in	other	parts	of	the	field?	Is	epigenetic	inheritance	really	related	to	new	ways	of	doing	science?	Conceptual	analysis	of	 theories,	beloved	by	philosophers	and	by	some	scientists,	must	be	complemented	to	achieve	accounts	that	are	more	grounded	and	useful	to	biologists.	Real	substance	of	metascientific	views	are	the	diffusion	of	those	concepts,	the	changing	role	 of	 those	 concepts	 in	 scientific	 research,	 and	 the	 congruent	 partitioning	 and	repartitioning	of	the	scientific	community	relating	to	various	ways	of	being	evolutionary	biologists.	Several	 studies	 already	 go	 in	 this	 direction.	 Scheiner	 (2013)	 performed	 some	 quick	quantitative	historical	analyses	of	ecology	to	measure	theory-engagement	 in	 that	 field.	Something	 similar	 might	 be	 done	 to	 assess	 the	 integration	 between	 evolution	 and	ecology.	 Love	 and	 colleagues	 (Love	 2003;	 Raff	 and	 Love	 2004)	 made	 interesting	attempts	to	re-evaluate	the	received	conviction	that	development	was	excluded	by	the	MS.	 To	 this	 aim	 they	 mixed	 historical	 and	 conceptual	 methods:	 they	 dissected	 the	different	 kinds	 of	 developmental	 studies	 that	 might	 have	 been	 excluded,	 looking	 for	clues	 about	 possible	 exclusion	 of	 one	 or	more	 of	 these	 ‘embryologies’;	 they	 searched	fields	 like	 morphology	 and	 paleontology	 that	 also	 were	 seemingly	 side-lined;	 they	spelled	out	different	kinds	of	exclusion.	But	even	more	can	be	done.	Information	 sciences	 have	 techniques	 for	 the	 automatic	 retrieval,	 analysis	 and	representation	 in	 corpora	 of	 big	 data.	 Recent	 studies	 have	 focused	 on	scientific/academic	 information,	 its	 search,	 recommendation	 and	distribution	 (McCain	et	al.	2005,	McCain	2008,	2009,	Riviera	2013).	Scientometrics,	i.e.	the	quantitative	study	of	science,	can	reveal	relations	between	units	such	as	authors,	disciplines,	 institutions,	semantic	 elements.	 Study	 of	 patterns	 in	 citations,	 texts,	 and	 user	 behaviors	 (McCain	2013)	 through	 time	 can	 trace	 ‘lineages	 of	 ideas’	 and	 reveal	 phenomena	 about	 the	scientific	 community,	 such	 as	 fields	 emergence	 and	 decline.	 The	 ongoing	 explosion	 of	online	journals	and	digital	archives	matches	perfectly	these	techniques,	although	it	also	demands	corrections	and	creative	solutions	as	the	analysis	goes	back	in	time	–	as	it	will	always	 do,	 since	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 metascientific	 claims	 are	 almost	 always	 historical	claims.	 The	 domain	 of	 analysis	 can	 also	 be	 expanded	 multilingually	 to	 conference	programmes	 and	 abstracts,	 research	 protocols,	 official	 documents,	 and	 to	 alternative	
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media	that	are	becoming	more	important	in	the	economy	of	scientific	work:	online	tools,	institutional	websites,	science	news	and	blogs.	Synthesis,	 if	 any,	 must	 have	 scientometric	 correlates,	 provided	 that,	 although	 textual	search	is	very	powerful,	it	must	be	guided	by	the	right	queries.	At	the	same	time,	work	in	the	social	 sciences	demonstrates	 that	understanding	scientific	 communities	 is	broader	than	bibliometrics.	For	example,	quantities	about	scientific	papers	should	be	related	to	the	 (changing)	 social	 function	 of	 scientific	 papers	 (Riviera	 2013).	 White	 and	 McCain	(1998)	affirm	that	techniques	such	as	‘authors	co-citation	analysis’	are	“no	substitute	for	extensive	 reading	 and	 fine-grained	 content	 analysis”:	 “they	 produce	 history	 of	 the	cliometric	sort,	which	leaves	out	almost	all	the	good	parts,	[for	example]	what	actually	gave	rise	to	the	most	significant	work”	(p.	327).	The	job	of	biologists	has	certainly	changed,	and	we	want	to	understand	how:	laboratory	ethnography	and	biographical	research	have	methods	to	answer	(see	Caduff	1999,	Hess	2001),	 and	also	 to	bring	 about	 reliable	 indicators	 to	obtain	 large	 scale	descriptions	of	evolutionary	biology.	 Some	prior,	qualitative	 study	of	 research	and	writing	practice	 in	biology	 will	 be	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 extract	 significant	 clues,	 indexes,	 proxies,	 and	patterns	 that	 can	 feed	 quantitative	 research	 and	 yield	 meaningful	 answers.	Ethnographic	 work	 must	 be	 in	 turn	 informed	 by	 sound	 theoretical	 knowledge	 and	epistemological	 hypotheses,	 if	 it	 has	 to	 provide	quantitative	 analyses	with	meaningful	search	keys.	Then,	 if	 we	 really	 want	 to	 understand	 and	 explain,	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 involve	knowledge	 and	methods	 from,	 e.g.,	 the	 sociology	 (Gieryn	 1983,	 1999,	 Bourdieu	 1993,	Riviera	 2013)	 and	 the	 economics	 (Stephan	 2012,	 Sent	 1999,	 Thicke	 2013)	 of	 science,	that	 hold	 important	 keys	 to	 the	 reasons	 for	 conformism	 and	 innovation,	 stability	 and	change	 in	 science.	 Talking	 about	 the	 MS	 as	 a	 ‘constraining	 theoretical	 framework’	 is	interesting,	 but	many	quarrels	 on	 the	plausibility	 of	 such	 a	 constraint	 arise,	 probably,	from	 the	 lack	 of	 serious	 consideration	 of	 other	 really	 constraining	 factors:	 policies,	politics,	 culture,	 economic	 investments,	 technology,	 reward	 structure	 of	 science,	 the	social	role	of	the	evolutionists,	the	structure	of	the	community,	and	the	like.	After	all,	the	scientific	 conformism	 that	 EES	 advocates	 attribute	 to	 the	 rigid	 theoretical	 framework	they	call	the	MS	might	well	find	appropriate	pieces	of	explanation	in	the	economic	and	social	 structure	 of	 science	 over	 the	 20th	 Century.	 This	 is	 why	 we	 also	 need	 to	 ask	economics	and	sociology	to	describe	the	social	dynamics	of	evolutionary	biology	and	the	conditions	 and	 identities	 of	 evolutionary	 biologists	 over	 time	 and	 across	 geographical	ranges.	If	these	aspects	are	changing,	considering	them	will	be	crucial	in	either	the	EES	or	other	metatheoretical	views	we	can	build.	The	birth	of	a	field	is	also	the	birth	of	a	new	way	of	doing	science,	as	well	as	a	statement	of	identity,	and	is	described	by	the	changing	conditions	of	the	scientific	community,	not	only	 by	 the	 map	 of	 involved	 concepts.	 What	 can	 or	 cannot	 be	 done	 in	 a	 science	 is	constrained	 and	 channeled	 by	 cultural,	 social,	 and	 economic	 aspects	 of	 science,	 for	example	technological	advances	and	costs,	or	cultural	obstacles	regarding	training,	 job	market	and	evaluation,	grant	systems,	publication,	language	barriers	(Sidlauskas	2009).	Sociology,	ethnography,	economics	and	history	have	 tools	and	knowledge	 for	all	 these	
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explanatory	 aspects	 that,	 moreover,	 are	 essential	 to	 any	 description	 of	 a	 scientific	community.	Scientific	 methods	 can	 thus	 let	 us	 observe	 the	 metascientific	 change	 of	 evolutionary	biology	 and,	 in	 face	 of	 their	 variety	 and	 heterogeneity,	 they	 should	 be	 themselves	‘synthesized’	in	some	way.	The	National	Center	for	Evolutionary	Synthesis	(Sidlauskas	et	al.	 2010)	 defines	 ‘synthetic	 science’	 as	 an	 integration	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 data	 from	multiple	sources.	Various	kinds	of	synthetic	science,	achieved	in	diverse	ways,	exist.	My	humble	methodological	suggestions	are,	at	this	stage,	only	meant	to	help	us	imagine	metascientific	views	that	are	built	with	a	more	scientific,	interdisciplinary	approach.	Of	course,	we	should	not	be	naïve	and	imbued	with	the	myth	of	‘data-driven’,	especially	in	this	 field:	 other	 complex	 issues	 about	metascientific	 views	 call	 for	 a	 serious,	 constant	philosophical	reflection	on	scientific	practice.	
3.	Philosophy	There	 are	 inherent	 difficulties	 in	 the	 achievement	 of	 any	 metascientific	 view.	 The	vastness	and	complexity	of	the	scientific	field,	seen	in	the	previous	section,	is	only	one	of	them.	 Other	 difficulties	 are	 the	 insufficiency	 of	 conceptual	 analysis	 to	 capture	 the	thickness	of	scientific	research,	the	entanglement	between	empirical	and	metascientific	concepts,	 between	 multiple	 chronologies,	 and	 between	 descriptive	 and	 normative	needs,	as	well	as	 the	 inevitable	stakeholding	of	any	reviewer	 involved	 in	 the	reviewed	field.	 To	 all	 these	 difficulties,	 a	 mature	 philosophy	 of	 science	 in	 practice	 can	 bring	 a	decisive	contribution.	Philosophy	of	science	in	practice	has	the	task	of	reflecting	upon	the	claims	for	synthesis	in	 the	 first	 place,	 and	 upon	 their	 role	 in	 the	 scientific	 community.	 The	 self-representation	 of	 scientists	 claiming	 for	 synthesis	 is,	 in	 fact,	 an	 interesting	 object	 of	philosophical	reflection.	Ernst	Mayr	wrote:	The	 term	 “evolutionary	 synthesis”	 was	 introduced	 by	 Julian	 Huxley	 […]	 to	designate	 the	 general	 acceptance	of	 two	 conclusions:	 gradual	 evolution	 can	be	explained	 in	 terms	 of	 small	 genetic	 changes	 (“mutations”)	 and	 recombination,	and	the	ordering	of	this	genetic	variation	by	natural	selection;	and	the	observed	evolutionary	 phenomena,	 particularly	 macroevolutionary	 processes	 and	speciation,	 can	 be	 explained	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 known	genetic	mechanisms	(Mayr	in	Mayr	and	Provine	1980,	p.	1).	We	should	contrast	Mayr’s	account	of	the	MS	–	taken	at	 face	value	by	EES	advocates	–	with	what	historians	of	biology	have	been	discovering	about	 the	MS.5	Cain	 (2009),	 for	example,	focuses	on	the	pragmatic	and	strategic	utility	of	claiming,	back	in	the	1930s,	to	be	part	of	 a	modernizing	 team	(see	also	Provine	1992,	 cit.	 in	Delisle	2011,	Smocovitis	1996).	To	the	 ‘architects’,	 the	claim	was	a	strategic	move	in	many	ongoing	battles,	and	personally	 useful	 to	 their	 careers.	 ‘Outsiders’,	 as	well,	 employed	 the	MS	 in	 ‘David	 and	Goliath’	narratives	to	muscle	their	way	through.																																									 																					5	Enlightening	 examples,	 beside	 cited	 Joe	 Cain,	 are	 Sahotra	 Sarkar,	 Betty	 Smocovitis,	 Michael	Dietrich,	William	Provine,	David	Depew,	Richard	Delisle.	
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Cain	(2009)6	argues	that	traditional	historiography,	following	the	lead	of	MS	claims,	has	been	 affected	 by	historical	 realism	 on	 the	MS,	 and	 that	many	 historical	 studies	 of	 the	synthesis	 period	 create	 forced	 links	 between	 anything	 that	 was	 happening	 and	 that	alleged	overarching	object,	the	MS.	The	idea	that	the	MS	‘is	there’	as	a	certain	object	was	born	and	cultivated	for	specific	reasons	 in	those	years.	Meanwhile	–	historians	show	–	architects	 of	 the	MS	 such	 as	Huxley,	 Simpson,	 Dobzhansky,	 and	Rensch	 held	 different	research	 agendas	 or	 even	 “incommensurable	 epistemological	 frameworks”	 (Delisle	2011,	 p.	 57;	 see	 also	 Cain	 2003),	 and	 paradoxically	 the	 advertised	 narrow	 set	 of	concepts	ended	up	by	being	an	obstacle	to	the	advancement	of	these	agendas.	History	 can	 actually	 be	 told	 differenly	 –	 for	 example,	 Cain	 thinks	 that	 while	 an	evolutionary	synthesis	at	the	theoretical	level	was	proclaimed,	a	synthesis	of	taxonomy	and	 systematics	 (old	 and	 new)	 was	 substantially	 more	 important.	 The	 ‘constructed’	nature	of	the	MS	was	epitomized	already	by	Burian	(1988)	when	he	defined	the	MS	as	a	‘‘moving	 target’’,	 with	 regards	 to	 both	 the	 list	 of	 its	 possible	 ‘architects’	 and	 the	boundaries	of	its	research	agenda.	A	 step	 in	 the	 ‘objectivization’	 of	 the	MS	was	 the	 1980	Conference	on	 the	Evolutionary	
Synthesis	 whose	 proceedings	 are	 Mayr	 and	 Provine	 (1980).	 Ernst	 Mayr	 was	 a	 very	influential	figure	throughout	20th	Century	evolutionary	biology.	He	(1973)	had	battled	to	 acknowledge	 “the	 naturalists”	 as	 he	 called	 them	 (e.g.,	 zoologists,	 paleontologists)	against	an	account	of	 the	MS	that	he	saw	as	too	 imbalanced	in	 favor	of	geneticists	and	mathematicians	 (targeting,	 e.g.,	 Provine	 1971).	 An	 important	 moment	 for	 the	establishment	of	Mayr’s	own	view	of	the	MS	was	the	1980	Conference.	Mayr	wanted	to	clarify	“the	sequence	of	events	[1936-1947]	leading	to	the	synthesis,	and	to	identify	the	factors	 responsible	 for	 the	 preceding	 disagreements”	 (Ibidem).	 But	 despite	 Mayr’s	‘general	acceptance’	view	of	the	MS,	even	a	cursory	reading	of	Mayr	and	Provine	(1980)	reveals	 a	 diversity	 of	 stories	 and	 visions	 of	 the	MS	 across	 points	 of	 view,	 disciplinary	backgrounds,	 geographical	 positions.	 As	 Provine	 noticed,	 the	 1980	 Conference	 and	proceedings	 are	 not	 a	 great	 example	 of	 consensus	 and	 agreement	 on	 a	 small	 set	 of	concepts,	despite	Mayr’s	efforts.	In	the	Epilogue,	Provine	wrote:	One	 note	 of	 unanimity	 at	 the	 conference	 may	 perhaps	 need	 to	 be	 revised.	Although	 all	 participants	 seemed	 to	 agree	 that	 an	 evolutionary	 synthesis	 had	occurred,	 they	 may	 have	 had	 different	 syntheses	 in	 mind.	 The	 evolutionary	synthesis	 may	 therefore	 have	 appeared	 more	 cohesive	 during	 the	 conference	than	it	actually	was	(Provine	in	Mayr	and	Provine,	p.	408).	There	is	not	much	consensus	on	the	proclaimed	consensus,	after	all.	1980	was	more	the	attempted	construction	of	a	 consensus	 than	 it	was	 the	account	of	 an	already	achieved	agreement.	We	 should	 probably	 derive	 two	 lessons	 for	 our	 interpretation	 of	 the	 EES	debate.	
																																								 																					6	Cain	wrote	many	papers	 describing	 the	 overall	 situation	 in	 the	MS	period.	He	 also	 published	equally	 interesting	 monographic	 studies	 focused	 on	 personalities	 such	 as	 Simpson,	 Sewall	Wright,	 Julian	Huxley,	Ernst	Mayr,	Theodosius	Dobzhansky.	Notice	that,	of	course,	Cain	is	 just	a	telling	example	and	that	historians	themselves	are	not	monolithic	at	all	in	their	consideration	of	the	MS	(cf.,	e.g.,	Sarkar	1992,	2004).	
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First,	 Ernst	 Mayr,	 along	 with	 others,	 produced,	 iterated,	 and	 defended	 for	 specific	purposes	the	view	of	the	MS	that	is	now	adopted	in	the	EES.	The	Modern	Synthesis	was,	first	 of	 all,	 a	 useful	 flag.	 The	 ‘conceptual	 pillars’	must	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 faithful	account	 of	 the	 scientific	 community	 at	 any	 time,	 but	 rather	 a	 manifesto	 flag	 for	 the	‘architects’	 in	 their	 respective	 times.	 This	 awareness,	 along	 with	 inconsistencies	 and	shortages	 of	 the	 available	 descriptions	 of	 the	 MS,	 may	 make	 us	 more	 cautious	 in	objectivizing	the	MS.	Second,	EES	claims	may	be	analogized	to	MS	claims:	the	EES	can	itself	be	seen	as	a	useful	flag,	although	obviously	in	a	completely	changed	socio-political	and	scientific	context.	If	the	 ‘flag	 effect’	 is	partly	 explanatory	 to	 the	MS,	 there	 is	no	 reason	why	we	 should	not	consider	 it	when	we	 think	 to	 the	EES.	A	 collection	of	 conceptual	 pillars	 (Fig.	 1)	 is	 not	necessarily	a	good	description	of	the	status	and	tranformations	of	evolutionary	biology,	whereas	 apparently	 it	 does	make	 an	 effective	 flag,	 an	 aggregating	 flag	 reminiscent	 of	Mayr’s	ensign.	The	instabilities	and	disagreements	we	have	described	stand,	in	part,	as	symptoms	 for	 all	 these	 partiality	 aspects.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 MS	 and	 the	 EES	certainly	represent	more	than	partisan	interests:	they	are	pleas	for	the	good	of	the	field.	With	reference	to	the	MS,	Delisle	(2011)	talked	about	a	“sociological	synthesis”	–	made	of	 transformations	 in	 the	 social	 configuration	of	 science,	 exchange	 among	disciplinary	communities,	institutional	bridges	–	as	something	separate	from	conceptual	unification	that,	 for	 him	 and	many	 others,	was	 never	 quite	 achieved.	 The	 EES	might	 represent	 a	continuation	 of	 the	 struggle	 –	 already	 present	 in	 the	 MS	 –	 against	 disfunctional	imbalance	of	prestige	and	resources	granted	to	molecular	methods	vs.	other	methods,	in	an	age	of	 cheaper	high-throughput	sequencing	 that	produces	streams	of	publications.7	Other	 redistributions	 might	 be	 at	 stake,	 for	 example	 between	 botanists	 and	microbiologists	 vs.	 zoologists,	 or	 concerning	 new	 means	 of	 knowledge	 such	 as	simulations.	The	EES	could	be,	today,	a	flag	for	many	streams	of	study	that	have	been	suffering	due	to	perceived	 scientific	 dominant	 tendencies	 or	 fashions,	 a	 flag	 recruited	 by	 an	 ongoing	struggle	 for	 very	 basic	 needs	 of	 any	 scientist:	 funding,	 publication,	 consensus.	 Let	 us	make	 some	 examples.	 Odling-Smee’s	 suggestion	 of	 niche	 construction	 (1988)	 waited	some	ten	years	to	be	taken	up	by	a	few	mainstream	modelers	and	population	geneticists	(Laland	et	al.	1996),	who,	in	turn,	offered	their	models	to	call	for	a	global	rethinking	of	evolutionary	biology	(Laland	et	al.	2009),	and	still,	 it	would	appear,	to	date	their	effort	have	 breached	 almost	 exclusively	 among	 philosophers	 and	 human	 scientists	 (e.g.,	Kendal	et	al.	2011).	Jablonski’s	work	on	multilevel	processes	in	macroevolution	was	part	of	 the	 paleobiological	 revolution	 (Sepkoski	 2012)	 since	 the	 1980s	 (Jablonski	 1986).	Macroevolution	 is	 today	a	big	and	consolidated	field,	but	the	most	radical	 implications	for	 evolutionary	mechanisms	 are	 still	 unsettled	 (Serrelli	 and	 Gontier	 2014).	 Jablonka	has	been	a	vocal	and	harsh	critic	of	the	MS	for	many	years	(Jablonka	and	Lamb	1989).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 evolutionary	 importance	 of	 epigenetics	 has	 been	 considered	negligible	 due,	 for	 example,	 to	 the	 lability	 of	 epigenetically	 transmitted	modifications																																									 																					7	One	thing	that	becomes	clear	from	a	reading	of	the	history	of	the	MS	is	that	it	sought	to	present	a	unified	front	against	the	rise	and	usurpation	of	molecular	biologists.	This	aspect	of	the	story	is	quite	relevant	to	understanding	what’s	going	on	with	the	EES	as	evolutionary	biologists	face	up	to	the	fact	that	many	of	their	tools	today	are	molecular.	
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over	 evolutionary	 time,	 and	 proponents	 like	 Jablonka	 have	 long	 been	 accused	 from	overusing	 a	 few	 experimental	 cases	 (e.g.,	 Haig	 2007).	 David	 S.	 Wilson	 (e.g.,	 2009)	describes	the	scientific	battle	over	group	selection	spanning	150	years,	beginning	with	Darwin.	 Wilson	 himself	 started	 a	 strenuous	 defense	 of	 group	 selection	 since	 1970s	(Wilson	1975;	Sober	and	Wilson	1998).	Notwithstanding	peer-reviewed	publications	on	the	 subject	 (Wilson	 and	 Wilson	 2007),	 a	 multimedia	 battle	 still	 goes	 on	 with	personalities	 such	 as	Dawkins	 and	Coyne	 that	 tirelessly	 deny	 any	 possibility	 of	 group	selection	in	evolution.	Kirschner	and	Gerhart	started	to	defend	evolvability	in	late	1990s	(1998).	Opponent,	Lynch	(e.g.,	2007)	keeps	bringing	back	evolvability	to	its	population	genetics	meaning	 (related	 to	heritability)	and	defines	other	versions	of	 evolvability	as	“speculation,	 which	 is	 almost	 entirely	 restricted	 to	 molecular	 and	 cell	 biologists	 and	those	who	study	digital	organisms”	(pp.	8602-3).	These	are	some	of	 the	various	 fierce	streams	of	research	that	have	decided	to	become	associated	with	the	EES.	Notwithstanding	the	various	reasons	of	the	involved	actors,	just	like	 the	 MS	 had	 helped	 the	 advancement	 of	 science,	 the	 EES	 really	 contains	 very	important	questions:	biology	has	 indeed	been	changing,	 and	 is	 changing,	 around	us	 in	many	 senses;	we	do	want	 to	 know	how,	 how	 fast,	 how	uniformly,	what	 scientists	 can	and	 should	 do	 to	 second	 positive	 movements	 and	 contrast	 negative	 ones.	 Answers	could,	for	example,	orient	economic	investment,	policy,	curriculum	planning,	publication	choices.	 But	 if	 the	 EES,	 like	 other	 pictures,	 is	 biased	 by	 ‘flag	 effects’,	 scientist-field	disproportion,	 and	 all	 other	 complexity	 factors	 we	 have	 reviewed,	 where	will	 we	 get	those	answers?	
4.	Conclusion	I	 have	 remarked	 the	 potential	 benefit	 of	 knowing	 ‘what	 is	 it	 to	 do	 research’	 in	 a	particular	 field:	 to	 plan	 biology	 training,	 to	 choose	 research	 lines	 in	 a	 lab,	 to	 navigate	career	 development,	 to	 connect	 specific	 researches	 to	 broader	 contexts,	 and	 to	make	policy	decisions	on	research	funding	and	reward,	all	in	order	to	make	the	field	advance	for	 the	 better.	 These	 are	 the	 high	 stakes	 and	 the	 promises	 of	 encompassing	metascientific	 views,	 such	 as	 the	 EES,	 that,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 encounter	 remarkable	difficulties	on	their	way.	The	EES	is	a	metascientific	claim	in	its	being	a	statement	about	what’s	new	in	how	evolutionary	biology	is	carried	out,	not	only	a	statement	about	what’s	new	in	evolution	as	we	know	it.	 	A	meaningful	answer	to	questions	 like	Pigliucci’s	“Do	we	 need	 an	 Extended	 Evolutionary	 Synthesis?”	 (2007)	 demand	 a	 great	 deal	 of	philosophical	reflection	and	an	interdisciplinary	work	with	disciplines	that	can	provide	scientific	models,	data,	and	evidence	about	scientific	communities.	Philosophy	of	science	and	 philosophy	 of	 biology	 are	 thus	 provoked	 by	 metascientific	 views	 not	 only	 to	empower	their	attention	to	scientific	practice,	but	also	to	revise	and	improve	their	own	methods	and	their	ability	to	integrate	with	other	disciplines.		
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